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Just like France, after its Revolution, had the great
honour of consecrating in the first of its Constitutions
the immortal rights of men, so will the Mexican
Revolution have the legitimate pride to show the world
that it is the first one to consecrate in a Constitution the
1
sacred rights of workers.
(Alfonso Cravioto, Address to the 1916-17 Constitutional
Assembly)

Introduction
Debate about labour regulation is not new. What is new is the urgency with which labour
law reform is promoted as an important fix to economic woes. In recent years, calls for
reform resound in poor and rich countries alike. The economic crisis in the United States
and in Europe has intensified these debates, making labour regulation a prime target for
reform. In several US states public sector unions have been under attack, depicted as a
privileged class that drains public funds with high wages, cosy benefits, and retirement
privileges that no other workers enjoy. Several European countries have introduced
austerity measures that target labour regulation and other foundations of the welfare state
as sources of economic waste that they can no longer afford. Moreover, it is argued that
“rigid” labour regulation hampers job creation, which can be strengthened through a
program of labour flexibilisation.
On the other hand, there is considerable opposition to labour flexibility from labour
activists and scholars who seek to defend the current structure. They regard today’s job
stability and benefits as historical achievements and fundamental rights. Defenders of
labour regulation want to preserve workers’ protections, which they see as the last line of
defence against enormous pressure from global capital, and resist the flexibility rhetoric,
which they see as the handmaiden of capital.
The dire situation of the labour movement worldwide is reflected in the crisis of
labour law as an academic field. The field is in a state of soul-searching, with scholars
attempting to determine how labour scholarship can grapple with the defeat of the
traditional labour movement and with conditions in the global economy that make its
recovery seem impossible.2
In this article, I examine two prominent arguments opponents of labour flexibility
have used to defend labour regulation, that labour regulation: is closely associated with
the nation’s identity, and is inherently progressive. These arguments have been widely
used in national debates in countries with strong traditions of social regulation and
welfare state institutions. Resonances of these argument strands can also be seen in
1
2

Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constituyente, 1916-1917 (Mexico, 1960).
See eg Davidov, Guy and Langille, Brian, eds, The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press 2011).
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regional debates, such as the debate about “Social Europe” and the future of social
regulation in the continent in light of further market economic integration.
This article focuses on the case of Mexico to show both these arguments’ appeal and
their downsides. Mexico proudly considers itself to be the first country to
constitutionalize workers’ rights and, for much of its modern life, has seen itself as a
social state. In the 1980s, however, Mexico introduced an economic liberalization
program that has had profound effects on its labour market and social security
institutions. Liberal reformers characterize labour law as a key, pending structural reform
to help the country get on a path to economic growth. Defenders of labour regulation see
it as one of the last bastions against an economic model that has thus-far produced
meagre growth and has increased social and economic inequality.
Challenging Mexico’s historical narrative, I show how social law was, and still is, a
truly transnational phenomenon, not necessarily associated with any one nation’s identity.
In addition, I examine how, even at the moment of its creation, social law was – and still
is – politically indeterminate and, thus, its inherent association with progressive politics is
unwarranted. Finally, I argue that the constitutionalization of social rights does not
guarantee progressive results. These critiques are relevant to the current debate about
labour regulation in Mexico, where political actors refer to the great achievements of the
Constitution to defend existing regulation. This defence fails to engage critiques about
the effects of social regulation on different groups of workers and on the economy in
general. Social law advocates using these arguments are prone to idealizing existing
social regulation, making it harder to consider potential alternatives. Ironically, neoliberal
advocates for labour flexibility have begun to use social law to justify their agenda,
reinforcing the assertion that social rights are politically indeterminate.
These insights from Mexico may be relevant to contemporary debates about social
regulation elsewhere. In particular, I examine the strong parallels between Mexico and
the debate about social regulation in Europe. In the European Union (EU), the project of
market economic integration is said to have undermined workers’ rights and social
entitlements at the national level. Those seeking to advance similar social protections at
the regional level have done so on identity terms, speaking of “Social Europe” as
reflecting the continent’s true self in need of institutionalization. These advocates have
sought to constitutionalize social rights at the European level to ensure those protections.
At the same time, those who regard further economic integration as a threat resist it on
identity terms at the national level, seeking to preserve the social protections of the
welfare state. Both regionally and nationally, resorting to social law is supposed to
advance progressive aspirations and resist the unfettered march of the market. Relying on
national –or regional- identity to justify social regulation, however, creates problems
similar to Mexico: failing to engage arguments about the effects of social law and
preventing the imagination of alternatives. At this moment of crisis for the euro zone,
when the monetary union’s viability is being tested, social law discourse has been
employed by the EU even as it pursues an austerity agenda; this indicates that the
political valence of this discourse is again in flux.
The article is divided in three parts. In the first part, I analyze the traditional narrative
of labour law in Mexico and challenge its historical claims to national identity and
3

progressive politics. I use the case of Mexico, the country that first enshrined workers’
rights in a Constitution, as a paradigmatic example of both the appeal and the pitfalls of
the social law position. I examine the insights that the critique of the traditional narrative
may contribute to the current debate about labour law in Mexico. In the second part, I
explore the caveats that the Mexican case may raise for debates about social regulation
elsewhere, particularly in Europe. I analyze how identity arguments play an important
role in the concept of “Social Europe” and the regulations or social provisions that are
assumed to be inherent to the nature of the EU. I will also show how some European
countries have used a national identity argument to defend their social regulation against
what they perceived to be a threatening pro-market European Union integration program.
In the third part, I examine what could be gained by abandoning identity-based arguments
and, instead, analyzing labour reform as part of a country’s overall development strategy.
I. The Case of Mexico and Its Labour Regulation
The reader might not know this, but the idea of social law and the constitutionalization of
workers’ rights originated in Mexico. Well, not quite. But that is, in a simplified way, the
traditional narrative in Mexico’s labour law scholarship. The idea of social law emerged
as a critique of classical legal thought in the late nineteenth century and was developed
by German and French jurists. These scholars challenged nineteenth-century classical
legal liberalism’s individualistic assumptions, critiqued its abuse of logical deduction and
condemned its social and economic consequences.3
Social law jurists argued that individualistic classical liberal law was inadequate to
deal with new, interdependent relations brought about by industrialization, urbanization,
economic globalization and deep social changes of the late nineteenth-century.4 These
scholars laid the foundations for and helped develop a new legal sphere called social law,
doctrinally situated between traditional private law and public law, in which the State was
an active participant. This new sphere introduced legal regimes we now associate with
the regulatory state, such as labour legislation, social security, housing law, sanitary law
and financial regulation.5 After World War I, there was also the rise of a new
international law regime to deal with war that created new institutions based on the idea
of interdependence.6
3

See Kennedy, Duncan, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in Trubek, David &
Santos, Alvaro, eds, The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge
University Press 2006) 37-40; Gurvitch, Georges, Le Temps Présent et L'idée du Droit Social (Paris, J.
Vrin 1932); Reimann, Mathias “Continental Imports - The Influence of European Law and Jurisprudence in
the United States,” (1996) 64 Tijdschrift Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 391, 398-99.
4
Kennedy, Three Globalizations 38.
5
Kennedy, Three Globalizations 38-39.
6
The International Labour Organization (ILO) was founded by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to deal with
the “labour question,” which was of increasing concern among Western powers and a potential source of
international conflict. Constitution of the ILO, pmbl, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 2713–14, 225 Consol.
T.S. 373 (“[C]onditions of labour exist involving such injustice hardship and privation to large numbers of
people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled.”). The legal
regime of labour law, which supersedes classical conceptions of property and contract, has conceptual
parallels with a new international law regime that supersedes classical concepts of sovereignty. Both fields
were influenced by social law ideas. This parallel is exemplified by the work of George Scelle, a French

4

Social law is paradoxical. Although it spread globally from Germany and France to
become a truly international phenomenon, it was understood as having a unique relation
to the particular society of each country where it took hold. Social law was often
considered grounded on some primordial, traditional or religious character of each
society that claimed it.7
Mexico provides a useful case study of the use of nationalism by social law
advocates. Mexico prides itself on its social legal system, which emerged out of the 1910
revolution, was enshrined in the 1917 Constitution and has a self-image of being very
progressive. The national identity justification of social law is not limited to labour
regulation but, indeed, exists in other domains. Establishing a communal form of land
ownership, in the form of “ejido,” was justified as an explicit opposition to the liberal and
individualistic property rights system and a return to pre-liberal and colonial forms of
land-tenure.8 The defence of the legal regime of natural resources, such as oil and water,
is also often justified on national identity terms.
When it comes to labour regulation, two main claims permeate the traditional narrative
of Mexican labour law textbooks: first, that labour law is of Mexican origin and, second,
that labour regulation is inherently progressive and helps all workers. Mexican labour law
scholarship has helped shape and sustain the idea that social law stemmed from a unique
Mexican reality – triggering the 1910 Mexican revolution – and that workers’ rights were
inserted in the 1917 Constitution thanks to the genius of Mexicans intellectuals, scholars
and politicians.9 The fact that the 1917 Mexican Constitution was the first in the world to
enshrine workers’ rights has lent credibility to these claims. Mexican jurists argue that,
just as France gave the world the first Declaration of the Rights of Men, Mexico gave the
world the first Declaration of Social Rights. The inauguration of this social legal system
within the 1917 Constitution has been closely associated with a progressive Mexican
state. The native and progressive characteristics of the social state are so central to the
state’s identity that to challenge them is to question its foundational justifications. It
amounts to unveiling the state’s main foundational fictions.10
jurist who began as a labour scholar and later became a renowned international law scholar. See eg Scelle,
Georges Le Droit Ouvrier: Tableau de la Législation Française Actuelle (Paris, Armand Colin 1932);
Scelle, Georges, Manuel Élémentaire de Droit International Public (Paris, Domat-Montchrestien 1943).
7
Kennedy, Three Globalizations at 46-50; see eg, Shalakany, Amr Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of
Comparative Law in the Arab World, in Riles, Annelise, ed, Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law
152 (Portland, Hart Publishing 2001) (justifying the civil code socialisation by Sanhouri in Egypt as
grounded on Islamic tradition); Kan’gara, Sylvia, “Analytical, Prescriptive and Resistant Characterizations
of ‘African’ Conceptions of Property: A Critique of Mainstream Assumptions about African-Western
Incompatibility” (SJD Dissertation, Harvard Law School 2003) (how the social function of property in
Africa was justified using indigenous notions).
8
See Nuñez Luna, Alejandra, “Water Law and the Making of the Mexican State, 1875-1917” (SJD
Dissertation, Harvard Law School 2011); Simpson, Eyler N., The Ejido? Mexico’s Way Out (Chapel Hill,
UNC Press 1937).
9
See eg Noriega Cantú, Alfonso, Los Derechos Sociales, Creación de la Revolución de 1910 y de la
Constitución de 1917 (Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 1988).
10
I borrow the term “foundational fictions” from Doris Sommer, who argued that the late nineteenth and
early twentieth-century novels in Latin America intended to foster a “passionate patriotism” in the new
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One way to think about the traditional labour law narrative is that Mexico has an
originalist constitutional tradition that is progressive and associated with the left. Think
of the work of Frank Michelman and William Forbath, depicting a social tradition in the
US, wherein welfare rights (work, housing, health) can be based on the constitution.11
Now imagine this stance represents the mainstream position.
This section analyzes the mainstream labour law scholarship in Mexico. I focus
particularly on the work of Mario de la Cueva, the foremost labour law scholar and one
of the main architects in constructing the legal foundation for the social state. He
imagined, argued and worked for the reconstruction of the Mexican legal system around
social law.12 I suggest that De la Cueva is to the Mexican twentieth century legal system
what Diego Rivera is to Mexican art – not because of equal fame or notoriety, but
because they shared a passion and a vision about the new social order, and created an
aesthetic and legal narrative to support it. Rivera heralds the post-Revolution Mexican
state as the modern response to colonialism and economic exploitation. Rivera’s murals
are an elegy to the new man, the worker, emancipated from his past chains. De la Cueva
paints the legal regime that would ensure workers’ liberation.
Rivera depicts the country in a path of industrialization, where nineteenth century
bourgeois capitalism, the old economic regime against which the revolution rebelled, is
superseded by a socialist state. The character of that social state is still not fully defined,
but it becomes clear early on that it is not a communist state. De la Cueva’s murals are
his major Mexican Labour Law textbooks, which create, document and justify this story
in legal theory and doctrine. Describing the creation of Mexican labour law, De la Cueva
tells us:
Mexican labour law is a statute imposed by life, a cry by men that only
knew of exploitation and ignored the meaning of the term: my rights as a
human being. It was born in the first social revolution of the 20th century
and found its most beautiful historic crystallization in the 1917
Constitution. Before those years there were efforts in defence of men,
actions were undertaken and ideas presented, but a regime that gave back
to work its liberty and dignity had not been achieved; they were lost in the
centuries of slavery, of servitude and of the bourgeoisie’s private law. The
idea that has now reached a universal character had not been declared:
nations. See Sommer, Doris, Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America (University
of California Press 1991).
11
See eg Michelman, Frank, “The Supreme Court, 1968 Term — Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
through the Fourteenth Amendment” (1969) 83 Harvard L. Rev. 7 (arguing equality of opportunity is
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution); Michelman, Frank, “In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice” (1973) 121 U. PA. L.
Rev. 962 (discussing John Rawls’ theory of inherent welfare rights based on the tradition of “western
individualistic democratic liberalism”); Forbath, William, “The Distributive Constitution and Workers’
Rights” (2011) 72 Ohio State Law Journal 1115 (depicting the history and significance of labour and
workers rights as fundamental rights).
12
De la Cueva, Mario, El Nuevo Derecho del Trabajo, 13th edn (Mexico, Editorial Porrúa 1993).
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labour law constitutes the new rights of the human person, the base
without which the old rights of men are not possible.13
This section problematizes this traditional narrative, most articulately formulated by
De la Cueva. I argue first that the critique to nineteenth century private law and the
proposal for social law as a way to overcome the doctrinal limitations and undesirable
economic consequences of legal liberalism was not purely Mexican in origin. Second, I
claim that the nature of the political compromise that enabled the constitutionalisation of
labour rights and the creation of new social law institutions was less radical at its
inception, and less progressive as applied, than is commonly portrayed.
Before subjecting the traditional narrative to scrutiny, however, I will describe its
relevance in the current labour reform debates. Political parties, activists and scholars
refer to the achievements of the Constitution and the historically progressive character of
labour legislation to buttress their positions. Exploring the grip this narrative has on the
way actors think and talk about labour regulation clarifies the relevance of its critique and
the possibilities that may open if we go beyond it.
A. The Debate about Labour Law Reform In Mexico
Labour law reform has been the subject of political debate for the last 22 years, since
liberalization reforms were introduced in the country by the Salinas administration
between 1988-1994. In this protracted debate, the achievements of the Revolution and the
historical legacy of the Mexican constitution play an important, if not always explicit,
role. The nationalist discourse that emerged after the Mexican revolution, created and
consolidated during seven decades of a one-state-party system in which the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruled, praised constitutionally protected workers’ rights and
labour legislation as a historical achievement. This legislation was considered a key pillar
of the country’s modern social, economic and political life. Today, more than two
decades after the introduction of economic liberalization policies, labour law reform is
considered a “pending” structural reform and is once again at the centre of political
debate. Since 1990, multiple proposals have been introduced, including bills by the three
main political parties: the centre-right National Action Party (PAN), which has ruled the
country since 2000, the leftist Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) and, in 2011, the PRI.
After the 2012 presidential elections and with a newly-elected congress, outgoingPresident Calderón introduced a labour bill that this time congress will be required to
vote on.14
The Constitution and federal labour law grant substantial protections to workers.
They took employment relations out of the civil law domain and created the country’s
social security system. In 1917, Article 123 enshrined workers rights in the Mexican

13

De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho, vol 1, 38 (emphasis in original).
Proyecto Decreto que Reforma, Adiciona y Deroga Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley Federal del
Trabajo, LXII Legislature (1 September 2012)
www.stps.gob.mx/bp/secciones/sala_prensa/Ini_Ref_Laboral_2012.pdf.
14
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Constitution and granted workers considerable protections.15 Based on these
constitutional rights, the federal labour law regulates the labour market in great detail,
dealing with both individual and collective employment relations. Article 123 seeks to
establish an equilibrium between workers and employers, and to advance social justice.16
It stipulates that labour is not an article of commerce; it should safeguard workers’
freedom and dignity and guarantee a decent standard of living.17 Importantly, federal
labour law’s procedural section is guided by a default rule that stipulates that whenever
there is doubt in the interpretation of the law, the Conciliation and Arbitral Board will
choose the one that favours workers.18 The Board is also required to supplement workers’
briefs when failing to request benefits they are entitled to.19
Despite these generous protections, Mexico’s labour market is in dire straits. The
working population totals approximately 50 million people.20 Every year, one million
youths become economically active and ready to enter the labour market; the country’s
economy has been able to create only half of those jobs.21 People migrate to the US to
find jobs, but many enter the informal economy by working on petty street commerce or
enter the ranks of drug cartels or other criminal organizations.22 Unemployment is
approximately 5.4 per cent, but this number does not capture a significant number of
workers: the approximately 8.3 per cent who are underemployed.23 Of the employed, a
great number have very precarious jobs, with meagre wages and no benefits. In fact, real

15

Article 123 includes the following requirements and provisions: eight-hour maximum workday;
minimum one day off per week; double payment for over-time work; prohibition on child labour; paid
maternity leave; right to equal pay for equal work regardless of gender; establishment of a minimum, living
wage; wage protection against discounts or reductions for debt obligations; establishment of employers’
liability for workplace accidents and illnesses; establishment of workers’ right to a share in the firm’s
profits; employers must comply with health and safety regulations; housing requirements for certain
sectors; recognized the right to unionize and the right to strike; employers cannot dismiss workers without
cause; and establishing of a tri-partite arbitral and conciliation boards to solve disputes between capital and
labour, staffed by government representatives, employers and workers. Political Constitution of the United
Mexican States (hereinafter “Mexican Constitution”), Art. 123 (1917).
16
Federal Labour Law of Mexico (Ley Federal de Trabajo) Art. 2.
17
Idem 3.
18
Idem 18.
19
Idem 685.
20
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), Indicadores Oportunos de Ocupación Y Empleo
[“Job Indicators”] (2012) www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/contenidos/espanol/prensa/comunicados/ocupbol.pdf.
21
Zepeda, Eduardo; Wise, Timothy, and Gallagher, Kevin, Rethinking Trade Policy for Development:
Lessons From Mexico Under NAFTA (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, D.C.,
Carnegie Endowment 2009); Kurtzman, Joel, “Mexico's Job-Creation Problem,” WSJ, 3 August 2007,
online.wsj.com/article/SB118610985048187068.html.
22
From 1990 to 2010, approximately 8.9 million Mexicans migrated to the United States. A recent report,
however, found that migration declined significantly in the last five years. Pew Hispanic Center, "The
Mexican-American Boom: Births Overtake Immigration" at 3 (2011)
www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/144.pdf. Possible explanations include increased unemployment and
greater deportations in the US and a spike of violence in the border area, decreasing birth rates and broader
economic opportunities in Mexico. Pew Hispanic Center, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and
Perhaps Less” (2012) www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/Mexican-migrants-report_final.pdf
23
INEGI, Job Indicators 2011,
www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/contenidos/espanol/prensa/comunicados/ocupbol.asp.
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minimum wages have declined dramatically in the last four decades.24 This suggests that
even in the formal economy there is a wide de facto flexibility in the labour market due to
low wages, informal or illegal part-time contracting by employers, outsourcing and the
non-provision of legally-mandated benefits. This further suggests that a considerable part
of the productivity gains in recent years have relied on decreased labour costs.
Consequently, the share of productivity gains to labour in general terms has decreased.25
Now consider the reform proposals advanced by the main political parties. Over the
past twelve years, each of the two government administrations headed by the PAN has
introduced a labour law bill. These bills proposed making labour market regulation more
flexible by creating new part-time, trial and training employment contracts. They also
proposed changes to collective bargaining rules that would make it harder for workers to
strike, prohibit closed-shop agreements and stop automatic withholding of union fees by
the employer. The PAN also proposes to introduce transparency and union democracy by
requiring free and secret elections (for strikes, control over collective agreements and
union leadership), imposing the obligation for unions to publish their balance sheets and
make them available to members, and requiring the publication of unions’ registration,
collective agreements and firms’ internal workplace regulations.
Opposition to the PAN bills has come from different sectors. These include the leftist
PRD, unions, activists, NGOs and labour law scholars. Many have emphasized the bill’s
violation of fundamental workers’ rights recognized not only in the Mexican constitution
but also in international conventions. In their view, the PAN bill sought to introduce the
neoliberal flexibility agenda, which jeopardized fundamental workers’ rights and
threatened to impoverish workers and weaken unions. Activists referred to the conquests
of the Mexican Revolution and the achievements of the Constitution as a way to resist the
neoliberal program, often portrayed as an import of an economic agenda designed abroad
and supported by employers, foreign economic interests and international financial
institutions. In addition, a number of independent unions and NGOs brought a complaint
before the NAFTA’s National Administrative Office, claiming the bill violated NAFTA’s
labour side agreement.26 Faced with the PAN’s bills, many groups on the left have
preferred the status quo.

24

“The real minimum wages in 2000 represented only a third of those of 1980; national wages in 2000
were equivalent to 50 per cent of those of 1980. By 2000, wages and salaries in large manufacturing plants
had dropped to less than 40 per cent of their level in 1990.” Salas, Carlos and Zepeda, Eduardo, Empleo y
Salarios en el Mexico Contemporáneo, in La Situacion del Trabajo en Mexico 37, 55 (México, Instituto de
Estudios del Trabajo 2003); Fairris, David, Popli, Gurleen and Zepeda, Eduardo, “Minimum Wages and the
Wage Structure in Mexico” (University of California Riverside, July 2005),
http://economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers05/05-09.pdf, 4, 23, 28; Zepeda, Rethinking Trade Policy 13-14.
25
Enrique Hernández Laos, La productividad en Mexico: Origen y Distribución 1960–2002, in Salas,
Carlos, ed, La Nueva, Situación del Trabajo en Mexico 2000-2003 (Mexico City, Instituto de Estudio del
Trabajo, 2006) 161, 168-69 (although productivity has remained low in Mexico from 1988–2002, workers
transferred much of their productivity gains to employers); see also Polanski, Sandra Mexican Employment,
Productivity, and Income a Decade After NAFTA,
www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/canadasenatebrief.pdf (Carnegie Endowment 2004).
26
See U.S. NAO Public Submission US2005-01 from the Washington Office on Latin America, to U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs (Feb. 17, 2005)
www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/submissions/Sub2005-01.htm (requesting that the U.S. National
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On the left, the PRD and the Workers’ National Union (UNT), an association of
independent unions, have proposed a bill that seeks to ensure stable and decent jobs in a
manner that could be consistent with productivity gains, to dismantle corporatist
institutions that benefit official unions and stifle union democracy, and to reform the
dispute settlement system.27 The PRD-UNT bill accepts some degree of flexibility
introducing, for instance, a limited version of the trial employment contract, but rejects
other flexibility modalities, including the formalization of outsourcing, proposed by the
PAN and PRI. The bill emphasizes that decisions on how to deploy labour to ensure
productivity, including training and promotion, must be taken bilaterally.28 It also
proposes to index wages to inflation to avoid further decline in real wages.29 On
collective bargaining institutions, the PRD-UNT bill proposes the creation of an
autonomous Public Registry, in charge of registering new unions and ownership over
collective bargaining agreements, taking that role away from the Ministry of Labour. It
keeps current rules that seek to resolve collective action problems. For instance, it
partially keeps the closed shop agreement, requiring workers to become union members
when they are hired – if the union and the employer have so agreed– but eliminates the
closed shop by exclusion, enabling workers to exit the union without being fired. It also
keeps rules that require employers to retain union fees. Finally, on administration of
justice, the bill would eliminate the long-standing tripartite Conciliation and Arbitration
Boards and replace them with labour courts, staffed by independent judges under the
jurisdiction of the judiciary.30
The PRI, which had opposed the labour law reform proposals made by this and the
previous PAN administrations and the PRD, introduced its own bill in 2011.31 The PRI’s
bill introduces significant forms of flexibility, leaves collective bargaining institutions
largely untouched, and preserves the current dispute settlement system. First, it proposes
a series of changes to the standard employment contract by introducing flexibility in
hiring and firing.32 It also seeks to formalize and regulate outsourcing, an extended

Administrative Office work with the Mexican government to eliminate alleged NAALC violations in the
labor law reform proposal).
27
Gaceta Parlamentaria, Cámara de Diputados, número 2989-IV (15 April 2010)
www.derechoasaber.org/data/arch_segui/_i200410-4.doc.
28
The bill requires firms to regularly send financial status reports to its workers. Art 116. It also introduces
some flexibility while also preventing the precarisation of jobs via low wages, unstable jobs and scarce
benefits. Pmbl. The bill recognizes the importance of performance-based promotion rather than seniority,
as well as the importance to train workers for multiple tasks. See eg Art 353-Z 19. It proposes that these
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employer practice that is currently illegal.33 The government would remain in control of
union registration and certification of elections and ownership of collective agreements.34
It consolidates the conciliation and arbitration boards but leaves them as tripartite bodies
largely dependent on the executive power. Thus, it seems that the PRI bill seeks to
compromise between two of its traditional constituencies: On the one hand, the bill seeks
to satisfy employers who demand greater forms of flexibility in hiring and firing, limits to
back wages payments for unfair dismissal and greater control over the allocation of
labour to multiple tasks and over promotion. On the other hand, the bill seeks to
guarantee that traditional corporatist unions will continue to enjoy a great degree of
control over collective bargaining institutions, keeping independent unions at bay. The
government would continue to have considerable say in the unions’ governance system,
keeping decisions of registration, confirmation of leadership and collective agreement
control in the Ministry of Labour.
After twelve years as the opposition, the PRI won the 2012 presidential election and
will soon be back in power. As the party that controlled the presidency and pretty much
all branches of government for more than seven decades – and as the creator of the
national revolutionary discourse – the PRI’s bill is indicative of the debate to come and
the upcoming government’s agenda. In its preamble, the PRI bill makes several
references to the historical achievement of the 1917 Constitution in enshrining workers’
rights:
The 1917 Constitution created Article 123, which for the first time in
history elevated labour law to the highest normative level. This was a
fundamental decision, bedrock of the modern State that has received
utmost recognition in the world.35
At every point, the bill declares that the proposed changes are necessary to improve
the country’s economic condition but are consistent with the historical achievements of
the Constitution and respect workers’ fundamental rights:
It is necessary to generate confidence in a private and international
investment that creates jobs in the formal economy while observing the
basic values of Article 123 and the basic rights of workers … These rights
must be well protected, as they have been since our first federal labour
legislation from 1931, and as they should be, being an example for all
social legislations in the world.36
The PRI revives the national revolutionary discourse to reach a compromise between
supportive capital and official labour. It is not surprising that the bill preserves the
privileges of the big labour unions traditionally affiliated to the PRI. However, the
malleability of the social law discourse is significant: the PRI resorts to social law
discourse to introduce a labour flexibility agenda, dear to business actors, that is
anathema to many of the labour protections associated with the social position. It does so
33
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by appealing to national pride and vowing continuity with the very constitutional
principles that the bill purports to modify.37
The stakes of labour reform are high. At bottom lie different visions of how to best
increase firm productivity, the relationship between labour and capital, the state’s
involvement in unions’ governance system, collective bargaining and dispute settlement.
These different visions have diametrically different implications for the distribution of
power and resources between capital and labour, and for democracy in the workplace.
Beyond the particular rules supported by the political parties, I am interested in a
common theme in these bills that evokes the historical achievement of the Mexican
Constitution. This trope is used both by those who want to oppose the neoliberal
flexibility program and those who want to preserve the corporativist regime currently in
place.
It is hard not to wonder why social law rhetoric, particularly concerning the
constitutionalisation of social rights, is so powerful in Mexico. Why does this alleged
historical achievement remain so appealing in contemporary debates? It would be useful
to investigate why it exerts so much influence: How it is that it still strikes a cord that
seems to go to the very sense of selfhood of the nation? Or, conversely, if nobody
believes in it any longer, if the once-faithful citizens have lost their faith, why do the
dogmas of such national faith need to be invoked de rigueur in the debate? Is this just a
simulation, a currency political actors have to use in the public space, a faith they
disbelieve in private but nonetheless profess in public? Whether this professed faith is the
expression of an honest belief or a cynical position, it seems worth examining what lies
behind this historical assumption. Subjecting this claim to critical scrutiny can shed light
on what is at stake in the “practice” of subscribing to it and reinforcing its validity.
In the following section, I will examine Mexico’s traditional labour law narrative,
outlining its main claims and probing why it has such as grip on the way people think
about Mexico’s history and its future. As I will show, legal scholars played a very
important role in weaving a discourse about “social law” that would become closely
associated to the nation’s character. Legal scholars’ reconstruction of the legal system
around the idea of social law, crystallized in the 1917 Constitution, would also be the
reconstruction of the nation’s self for much part of the twentieth century.
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B. Workers’ Rights: A National Invention?
Mexican legal scholars emphasize the national invention of social and workers’ rights,
and consider Mexico’s 1917 Constitution to be a significant contribution to the world’s
jurisprudential history as the first “Declaration of Social Rights.” I have identified three
main claims: (1) social and workers’ rights are the result of the 1910 Mexican revolution
and, thus, a response to Mexican socioeconomic reality; (2) workers’ rights are the
invention of Mexican actors, be they intellectuals, revolutionary leaders, legal scholars,
or politicians; and (3) workers’ rights are the product of the 1917 Constitution and
resulted from that historical constitutional debate.
These claims are prevalent in the traditional narrative of Mexican labour law
scholarship. Affirmed by the canonical texts in the field and passed on to every
generation of law students, there seems to be a strong interest in reinforcing the Mexican
contribution to the origin of workers’ rights and, more broadly, social rights. In this
section, I explore these claims and, given the difficulty in sustaining this assumption, I
begin to explore what may be the reasons for maintaining a nationalistic narrative.
i. Workers’ Rights as the Result of the 1910 Mexican Revolution
Traditional labour law scholarship considers the creation of workers’ rights and of social
rights in general to be an achievement of the 1910 revolution.38 According to this view,
the revolution was a response to the oppressive social and economic conditions under
which workers and peasants lived during the long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. This
socioeconomic reality inspired the development of workers’ rights and labour law.
According to De la Cueva, the 1917 Mexican Constitution is itself the first Declaration of
Social Rights.39 De la Cueva asserts that this Declaration “stemmed from the tragedy and
suffering of the people, and it was a natural, genuine, and authentic creation of the
Mexican people, of the men who offered their life in the war of the revolution.”40
The connection between the 1910 Mexican Revolution and the enactment of workers’
rights is not as straightforward as the traditional narrative assumes. “Social” legislation
existed before the armed movement. De la Cueva himself references labour legislation in
Mexico preceding the revolution. For instance, in the last decade of the dictatorial regime
of Porfirio Diaz from 1900 to 1910, two Mexican states enacted pro-worker statutes: In
1904, the State of Mexico enacted a workers’ compensation law for injuries caused by
workplace accidents, making employers liable for health care costs and full salary for up
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to three months.41 In 1906, the state of Nuevo León also enacted a law for workplace
accidents.42
Furthermore, according to De la Cueva, during the interventionist government of
Maximiliano of Habsburg -an Austrian prince imposed by the French government at the
behest and with the collaboration of conservative groups in Mexico- Maximiliano
enacted Mexico’s first labour law, the “Labour Law of the Empire” (1865).43 As De la
Cueva points out, this law contained some of the workers’ benefits later enshrined in the
1917 Constitution.44 It is telling that so many years before the Mexican revolution,
Maximiliano, a European prince arguably detached from the Mexican reality, had
implemented pro-worker legislation.45 However, De la Cueva does not seem to give
much importance to these historical precedents.
Examples in De la Cueva’s books suggest that labour laws were enacted before the
1910 Revolution in at least two states. In fact, a foreign ruler had introduced pro-worker
legislation as early as the mid-nineteenth century. This evidence weakens the assumption
that only the revolution’s unique context had influenced the content of the 1917
Constitution. In fact, existing legal doctrines and ideas about social law originating in
Europe and circulating worldwide also seem to have provided ammunition in the passing
of this legislation. As I will discuss below, the revolution may have accelerated the
enactment of labour laws by different states throughout the country, and it may have
given a justification to the members of the Constitutional Assembly to enshrine workers’
rights in the Constitution, but the revolution cannot be considered the sole determinant.
ii. Workers’ Rights as the Invention of Mexican Intellectuals and
Legal Scholars
Another important argument in labour law scholarship posits that the intellectual origin of
workers’ rights in the country is entirely Mexican. Additionally, scholars argue that the
various labour laws enacted in the country after the Revolution were entirely a domestic
development and were not influenced by foreign laws. However, at the time, important
ideas promoting the need to establish workers’ rights were fermenting in the public
debate transnationally. As I will show, some of the main intellectuals and legislators
promoting the recognition of workers’ rights were participants in a transnational
movement for labour rights and were influenced by social law discussions going on in
other countries.
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a. Influence of Foreign Ideas
In his book, Social Rights, A Creation of the 1910 Revolution and of the 1917
Constitution,46 Alfonso Noriega Cantú, an influential Mexican legal scholar, attributed
the origin of social rights to the Mexican Revolution and the Mexican Constitution. He
explicitly addressed the question of whether the 1910 Mexican Revolution was inspired
or influenced by Marx’s ideas and those of other critics of the capitalist system.47 Noriega
contended that foreign theories had “no influence whatsoever” on the actors of the
Revolution or those who wrote the Constitution and concluded that the 1910 Revolution
“formed its ideological content inspired in the Mexican historical reality.”48
In the course of arguing about the indigeneity of the 1910 revolution, Noriega
identifies several Mexican intellectuals who promoted the creation of social rights in the
period before the Revolution.49 These were the great critics of Porfirio Diaz’s dictatorship
whose critiques were expressed in the Program of the Liberal Party of 1906 and Flores
Magón’s newspaper Regeneración, among other sources.50 These ideas were articulated
in the two most influential Manifestos of the Revolution, the Plan de San Luis and Plan
de Ayala, issued by revolutionary leaders Ignacio I. Madero and Emiliano Zapata,
respectively.51 Unfortunately, Noriega neglected to investigate the intellectual
background of the Mexican critics he refers to, especially of the most central among
them, Ricardo Flores Magón.
Consider Ricardo Flores Magón, who Noriega and most labour law scholars recognize
as an intellectual influence of the Revolution52 and of labour law legislation.53 Noriega
failed to inquire into Flores Magón’s background and did not notice that he was a
participant in a transnational intellectual and political movement critiquing economic
liberalism and promoting “social law” ideas. Flores Magón’s publications, along with a
variety of biographies, highlight the influence of European and US thinkers on his liberal
and anarchist political theories.54 That Flores Magón was influenced by and was himself
in conversation with foreign ideas and intellectuals does not diminish his intellectual
46
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stature or originality. It does, however, cast doubt on the assertion that social rights ideas,
even those promoted by Flores Magón, were homegrown.
The Catholic Social Doctrine was an additional intellectual source in the creation of
social law. The influence of social Catholicism in Mexico can be traced to the second half
of nineteenth century.55 Labour scholars have recognized the importance of this doctrine
in labour law in general, and in the Mexican labour regime in particular.56 Notably, Pope
Leon XIII’s Rerum Novarum advocated for the reconciliation of social classes, affirming
that “without work there can be no capital, neither can be work without capital.”57
Among its main postulates, the encyclical included respect for private property,
conciliation of classes, mutual cooperation for capitalist production and workers’ welfare
and unionization to assure decent living conditions.58 If these ideas had an impact in the
creation of labour legislation, it would be evidence of yet additional influence of foreign
ideas in the Mexican intellectual and political milieu that resulted in the protection of
workers’ rights.
b. Influence of Foreign Laws
Just as there is a tendency to deny the influence of foreign ideas in the creation of
workers’ rights in Mexico, there is also a tendency to deny the influence of foreign laws
in the local labour legislations that followed the 1910 Revolution. De la Cueva, for
instance, notes that the 1918 Labour Law of the State of Veracruz – the first State statute
enacted after the promulgation of the Constitution – emphasized the statute’s national
character in its preamble.59
“[I]t was a permanent criterion to create a law, that was above anything else, Mexican
… that was a product of our environment, a legitimate daughter of our Revolution and
of our fundamental laws, that faithfully responded to our needs. …We did not want to
fill the law with translations or copies of foreign laws, even if wise; we did not want to
include any precept for the sake of an elegant or precise form which was formulated
by legislators of other countries; we fundamentally wanted to guarantee the
application of the law to our environment, to our social and political conditions, to our
present situation.60
For De la Cueva, this was consistent with Mexican labour law’s origin, which was “born
in the fields and from revolutionary men, and which is not and has never been an extra
logical imitation of other peoples’ norms.”61 According to De la Cueva, Veracruz’s
statute would greatly influence the first federal labour law (1931). The assertion of
55
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national origin, however, is in tension with a previous acknowledgment. De la Cueva had
already pointed out that the 1904 and 1906 state laws were greatly inspired by the French
Law of 1898.62 In fact, by 1918 Congress considered it preferable to enact specific laws
to address each of the various aspects of labour relations rather than a single code.63
According to De la Cueva, this position explains the two draft laws for “workplace
accidents,” “one of which … was preceded by an excellent exposition of the theory of
professional risk.”64 The theory of professional risk, as De la Cueva noted, was a French
legal development. The importation of this theory into this draft project, and finally to the
1931 federal law, seems clear.
iii. Workers’ Rights as a Creation of the 1917 Mexican Constitution
There is no stronger claim about the Mexican provenance of workers’ rights than the
proposition that Mexico’s 1917 Constitution was the first in the world to enshrine such
rights. Labour law textbooks commonly cite Mexico as the “first country to enact social
rights in a constitution.”65
Based on this temporal advantage, Mexican scholars often argue that the Mexican
Constitution created the concept of social rights, and that such rights were Mexicans’
direct response to their country’s reality.66 My interest in this section is not to debate the
temporal priority of the Mexican Constitution in the inclusion of these rights, which
seems clear, but to inquire about the origin of these ideas and how workers’ rights made
it into the constitutional text.
Mexico’s legislative activity after the Revolution shows that the inclusion of worker’s
rights in the 1917 Constitution did not happen in a vacuum. Rather, it had an immediate
precedent in the legislative work of states during the years of the revolution. Between
1914 and 1917 – from the overthrowing of General Victoriano Huerta to the victory of
Carranza over the other revolutionary factions – a number of Mexican states enacted
labour legislation recognizing a series of workers’ rights.67 Some of these laws paid
explicit attention to labour laws in other countries.68
The existence of foreign influence in the Constitution is evident from the comments in
the Constitutional Assembly. In a revealing moment, Alfonso Cravioto made a now
widely-cited pronouncement that compared the Mexican Revolution and its Constitution
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to the French revolution and its subsequent Declaration of the Rights of Man.69 Yet, in
this same speech, Cravioto made an additional important revelation: he rose to defend
Carranza and José Natividad Macías, who, in the heated debates, had been branded
“conservatives” by the radicals. He praised Carranza’s interest in labour, noting that
“Carranza had commissioned Macías to go to the United States and study there,
profusely, the future Mexican labour laws.”70
Similarly, labour scholar Alberto Trueba-Urbina, a staunch supporter of the originality
of the Mexican Constitution, discusses the 1916-17 Constitutional Congress and the
process of creation of Article 123.71 Among the many documents he refers to, however,
one can find the very same project of the Commission for Article 123, headed by
Natividad Macías, establishing the basis for labour legislation. In the Preamble, the
influence of foreign ideas is evident:
[T]he useful lessons that foreign countries have given us, concerning the
favourable conditions in which their economic prosperity takes place, due
to the social reforms implemented … suffice to justify this initiative, so
that it can take effect this time and fill the existing gap of our codes, to
maintain the desired equilibrium in the relationships between workers and
employers, subordinated to the moral interests of humanity in general, and
of our nationality in particular.72
It is clear that Mexican Congressmen were very aware of labour legislation in other
parts of the world. There is an important difference between enshrining workers rights in
the Mexican Constitution and claiming that workers’ rights, or more broadly social rights,
are the creation of the Mexican Constitution. There is no doubt that those participating in
the Assembly deemed these rights necessary for the Mexican socio-economic conditions.
But the legal, doctrinal, philosophical developments that led to the creation of those
rights did not stem organically from the socio-economic conditions that the new
constitution sought to remedy.
Some of Article 123’s key provisions, including the eight-hour work day, the
prohibition of child labour and the employer responsibility for workplace accidents, were
the topics of Mexican and other countries’ legislation before the Revolution. Consider the
French doctrine imposing liability on employers for workplace accidents, moving away
from fault or negligence liability and towards strict liability.73 The legal theory that the
State could regulate relations between employers and workers directly by requiring a
minima of conditions, rather than leaving those to the parties’ free will; the moral idea
69
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that the state had an obligation to stop exploitation and improve the conditions under
which workers laboured and lived; and the economic idea that this regulation was
beneficial to society all existed before the debates in the Constitutional Assembly.
It is possible to believe that the inclusion of worker’s rights in the Mexican
constitution corresponded to a political opportunity that was seized by Mexicans
influenced by these ideas at the end of the revolution. In this sense, the struggle for
workers’ rights and the idea of social law were connected to a truly international
phenomenon. But to conclude that social rights – and more specifically workers’ rights –
were the creation of the Revolution, the original creation of Mexican intellectuals and
legal scholars or the product of the 1917 Constitution, does not stand in light of serious
scrutiny.
C. The Political Character of Labour Law
i. Labour Law as a Radical Political Project
The twin argument of the national origin of social law in Mexico is that it was a
politically radical program at its inception. The inclusion of workers’ rights in Article 123
is portrayed as the result of a winner-take-all victory and the institutionalization of a
radical program. The most notable labour law scholars in the country have certainly
contributed to this idea, weaving a narrative of a legal regime with huge emancipatory
potential.
According to several accounts, Article 123 was the triumph of the radical legislators
over the conservatives in Congress.74 However, the most important triumph for the
radicals was not the definition of the rights’ content, which were already envisioned for a
subsequent labour statute, but instead their inclusion in the Constitution itself. Although
there seemed to be considerable agreement in the Assembly over the need to legislate
workers’ rights, their constitutionalisation was perceived as innovative and radical at the
time.
There was a heated debate in the Constitutional Assembly about whether workers’
rights should be included in the Constitution. Many thought it was enough to grant
Congress the constitutional powers to legislate on labour regulation and argued for letting
Congress pass a labour statute later.75 This position represented the view originally
supported by Venustiano Carranza, the drafters of the Project of the Constitution and the
faction of the renovators. This coalition was strongly opposed by a handful of radical
Congressmen. In one of the most cited passages of the debates, Heriberto Jara argued:
[T]he jurists, the publicists, the general experts of legislation, will
probably find ridiculous this proposition: How would a Constitution
74
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include maximum work hours? How would it point out that the individual
should not work more than 8 hours a day? That, according to them, is
impossible; that, in their opinion, pertains to the regulation of [ordinary]
laws. But precisely, what has this theory done? That our Constitution, so
liberal, so broad, so good, had resulted in, as the Scientifics call it, ‘a suit
of lights for the Mexican people’, because that regulation was never
passed. … The eight-hour work-day … is to guarantee the freedom of
individuals, it is precisely to guarantee their lives, to guarantee their
energies, because until now Mexican workers have only been subject to
exploitation.76
Several representatives delivered passionate speeches supporting this motion.77 A
position to include workers’ rights in the Constitution, even to create a whole new title,
gathered momentum.78 When this trend seemed irreversible, Carranza commissioned
representative José Natividad Macías to support the creation of a special constitutional
section for labour.79 Macías had previously elaborated a labour code commissioned by
Carranza, which was then the basis for what would become Article 123.80
The achievement of the radical faction in the Assembly consisted not so much in the
content of workers’ rights but in their inclusion in the Constitution. The radicals wished
to enshrine what they saw as a key promise of the revolution, probably out of distrust that
a future labour code would pass. This accomplishment should not be belittled. As can be
gleaned from the constitutional debate, there was considerable opposition by the legal
elite amongst the Congressmen. The radical faction succeeded in doing something that
seemed unorthodox for the liberal jurists at that time; in defying the liberal constitutional
models available, the radical Congressmen prioritized substance over form and succeeded
in constitutionalizing workers’ rights.
Labour scholars have made two common claims about the progressiveness of Mexican
labour law that form part of the traditional narrative: first, that labour law had radical
objectives and would inaugurate a new social and economic order; and, second, that these
radical goals reached their apex during the government of President Lázaro Cárdenas
(1934-1940), what is conceived of as the golden era for the legacy of the 1910

76

Rouaix, Genesis 77-78. This passage is cited in every labour law book. See De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho
49, Nestor de Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 343-352, Trueba-Urbina, Derecho Social 47-48.
77
Hector Victoria, the representative of the state of Yucatán, a state that had already enacted a labour
legislation” including “maximum daily hours, minimum wages, weekly rest, health in the factories and
mines, industrial agreements, creation of tribunals of conciliation and arbitration, prohibition of evening
work for women and children, accidents, insurances, compensation, etc.” Rouaix, Genesis 80.
78
This position was advanced by Froylán Manjarrez, arguing that he did not “care whether this
Constitution adjusts to the models foreseen by the jurists…what I care about is that we attend the clamour
of the men that participated in the armed struggle and deserve that we look for their welfare … Let us not
fear that our Constitution be a little bad in its form … let’s go to the substance of the question.” Rouaix,
Genesis 81; Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constituyente, 1916-1917 (Mexico, 1960) 986.
79
De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 50.
80
Nestor de Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 345-46.

20

Revolution.81 After Cárdenas, the story goes, these principles were subverted or betrayed
by subsequent administrations and by the leadership of the labour movement.
De la Cueva was one of the most fervent advocates of the progressive character of
labour law and its radical goals. He referred to the creation of social law as:
[T]he revolution of equality as a guarantee of liberty, dignity, and welfare
for all human beings, a political and juridical system in which the
Aristotelian phrase of justice “to give to every one his own” is substituted
by the Marxist formula “to give to every one what he needs.”82
According to this view, labour law was a major victory for the working class. It was
not only a protectionist law, but also created a status-based law of the working class.83
Article 123 stood for the elimination of the liberal distinction between private and public
law, and for the creation of social law, which would give legal force to labour’s struggle
against exploitation and for social justice.84
Labour law scholars share nostalgia for labour law’s presumed original radical aims
and for their golden era under president Cárdenas’s government. Cárdenas’ support for
the labour movement is praised and widely acknowledged.85 Scholars point to the end of
Cárdenas’ government as the turning point in the labour system.86 After the Cárdenas
administration, the government began deradicalising and weakening labour unions,
enabling the ratification of national unity agreements and demobilising the transformative
character of the labour movement.87 For instance, the Confederation of Mexican Workers
(CTM) – the largest labour organization ever in the country created with Cárdenas’
support – substituted its radical slogan, “For a society without classes,” with the more
moderate one. “For the emancipation of Mexico.”88 Labour scholars are both nostalgic
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for Cárdenas’ golden age and disillusioned by the de-radicalization of organized labour
and of the labour regime in general.89
ii. Labour Law as a Political Compromise
Analyzing the constitutional debates in the 1916-1917 Assembly and the developments
that led to Article 123, a different story is available: the labour regime did not emerge as
a truly radical project that then declined and demobilized, as prominent labour scholars
have argued, but, rather, it was a non-radical compromise from its inception. Pastor
Rouaix, who chaired the Commission in charge of writing workers’ rights’ special title in
the Constitution, provides a detailed account of this compromise.90 The preparatory work
for the article generated heated debates before reaching a final decision.91 The outcome,
according to Rouaix, was a compromise between the opposing factions participating in
the Constitutional Assembly: “the meetings … were the fraternal amalgam of Jacobins
and moderates, renovators and military men, Carrancists and Obregonists, united by one
sole flag: the flag of fatherland.”92
Rouaix’s book sought to set the historical record straight after the publication of two
books written by representatives in the Constitutional Congress.93 Both books’ authors
claimed credit for its respective faction for the social reforms implemented in the 1917
Constitution.94 That these authors could each appropriate the outcome of the Constitution
– to some extent true – further confirms that Article 123 was a compromise between
competing factions that suited both the “renovators” – whose leader was the main author
of that Article – and the “radicals.” 95
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Additionally, Social Catholicism was an apparent influence in this ultimate
compromise. The meetings took place at the chapel in the Bishop of Querétaro’s
residence, where “the theoretical principles of Christianity, which so many times had
been praised in that place, had their practical realization”96 That the Commission’s chair
saw Article 123 as an application of the principles of Christianity, even in its most
progressive articulation at that time, further suggests that the compromise was far from
being a radical victory.
Furthermore, even the labour movement’s golden era, under Cárdenas, looks less
radical that what many scholars portray.97 Cárdenas can be read as explicitly forging a
compromise position:
The main action of the Revolution’s new phase is Mexico’s march toward
socialism, movement that equally sidetracks from the anachronistic norms
of classic liberalism and from those of communism.
…
Within this doctrine, the Mexican state is not limited to be a simple
guardian of order, with tribunals to adjudicate according to the law of
individuals; neither can it become the head of the national economy, rather
it tends to turn into the regulator of the great economic phenomena
registered in our regime of production and wealth distribution.98
What Cárdenas calls socialism is, in his words, right in the middle of the two radical
political options: liberal laissez-faire and communism. Cárdenas describes Mexico’s
revolutionary path as a compromise between these two positions, in which a private
property capitalist system is maintained and moderated through government intervention.
Interestingly, the same scholars who assert Article 123 is a victory of a radical
political position acknowledge Cardenas’ less than radical actions and legacy regarding
labour unions. De Buen, for instance, claims that Cardenas’ legacy to the labour
movement was the creation of a national labour confederation, the CTM, with a socialist
orientation. He explains that Cárdenas created the CTM to weaken and replace the then
largest labour confederation, the Mexican Regional Confederation of Workers (CROM),
which was strongly associated with Cárdenas predecessor, former President Calles. Thus,
Cárdenas needed a labour organization that would support his administration and his
policies.99 De Buen notes that even though CTM had originally a Marxist orientation, it
was never, not even at its creation, a combative union. Rather, the CTM “was born
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demobilized,” since it was Cardenas’ instrument to fight CROM’s political force.100 De
Buen concludes that Cardenas’ formidable work is not exempt from errors: “[H[is love
for labour unity led him to create an organism that was later to represent the most
negative aspect of the labour movement.”101
Employers accused Cárdenas of being communist.102 As a response, in his labour
policy agenda, Cárdenas explicitly rejected the influence of any communist groups in his
administration, argued for the need to create a single worker’s organization to end
industrial conflict, reinforced the role of the government as arbitrator of social life, and
stressed that workers’ demands would always be considered within the margins of firms’
economic possibilities.103
A final word about the labour movement before Cárdenas‘s administration is in order.
Scholars refer to the syndicalist group “La Casa del Obrero Mundial” as combative and
with revolutionary aspirations until its leaders made an agreement with Venustiano
Carranza in 1914 to join the Revolution.104 De Buen notes that “in that moment, the
demobilized unionism was born.”105 During the period from Carranza to Cárdenas (19171934) the cooptation of unions, or their corporatist alliance with the government, and
their transformation into political instruments was accomplished.106
These accounts provide a picture of a labour movement at odds with the radical
character that labour law scholars often project onto the past. While there were clearly
radical elements in the labour movement, it seems that right after the Revolution, most
unions came into the fold and compromised with the state. They forewent their radical
aspirations in exchange for government protection and benefits. Cárdenas’ golden era
seemed to have continued this corporatist logic. Even if he was pro-labour, as Cárdenas
undoubtedly was, he successfully created the CTM to consolidate his political power. The
CTM stands today, as the monument to corporatism and official unionism, far removed
from any progressive agenda.
iii. A Typology of the Political Character of Social Law
The compromising character of the “social” was not limited to the case of Mexico.107
Moreover, critiques of classical liberalism seeking to reconstruct the legal system around
the idea of the social were not necessarily associated with the left or the right. The term
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“social” could be claimed by anyone not associated with Marxism or liberalism.108
Indeed, the strength of the social was that it did not associate ideologically with the
political divisions of the time.109 As to the role of the State, the social favoured equally a
reconstruction through the State and a reconstruction through civil society. Thus, the
social encompasses two divergent positions with regard to the question of labour: one
position for social regulation by the State, and another in opposition to State
regulation.110
The nature of the social compromise in Mexico was a progressive move from the old
classical, liberal legal and economic regime, not a conservative one. It was a corporatist
project, but it was not fascist. It was decidedly not a radical project; it was far from being
a communist program or to even contain the seeds of it. The groups that did not
participate in the reconstruction of the legal order through the State were those who
represented the old, liberal capitalist system associated with Diaz’s regime and those who
wanted a communist regime. The reconstruction was also a secular compromise, not a
religious one. The groups that desired a reconstruction through civil society and opposed
the State remained at the fringe. This includes groups from both the left and the right. On
the left, anarchist groups regarded the State as perpetually in alliance with the dominant
capitalist class that oppressed workers and peasants. On the right, Catholic groups
resented the State for limiting the role of the Church in public and private affairs, and for
limiting religious expression while propagating a secular ideology. These groups entered
into conflict with the State at different points following the 1917 Constitution, as the new
compromise was consolidating.
D. Explaining the Traditional Narrative
If these critiques are plausible, two questions emerge: First, why did these scholars argue
so adamantly for the national and radical character of labour law? Second, why does it
matter? I see at least three main projects furthered by this narrative.
(1) The professional project. These scholars created a new field in legal scholarship –
labour law – and at the same time claimed to be renovating the whole legal system
around the idea of social law. This project opened up space for progressive scholars and
situated them at the vanguard of an otherwise formalistic and doctrinal private law
scholarship.111 These scholars became the standard-bearers of a fully-fledged renovation
of the legal system.
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This professional project emerged from a theoretical and doctrinal breakthrough
adopted, crafted and claimed as theirs in the domestic legal academy. To gauge the
impact on these scholars’ professional careers consider the case of De la Cueva, who
became not only a renowned legal scholar but also a public intellectual and a government
advisor. Labour law became a springboard into constitutional law, legal theory and legal
philosophy.112 Founding the field of labour law marked the beginning of a stellar
professional career. He became President of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
Mexico (UNAM) in 1936-1942, Dean of the UNAM Law School in 1952-54, and later
Emeritus Professor of Law, and Doctor Honoris Causa. De la Cueva received, from the
President of Mexico, the 1978 National Prize of Arts and Sciences in History, Social
Sciences, and Philosophy. He is also revered as a professor and remembered as a mentor
by many law students who would later become legal scholars, writers, and politicians.
Thus, De la Cueva’s creation of the labour law field, along with other renowned scholars,
can be seen as an effort to forge a professional project, which involved a serious
intellectual agenda and a claim to expertise, a career ambition in the legal academy and
state institutions, and a desire to influence his peers as well as future generations.
(2) The political project. Labour scholars intervened in the national questions about
distribution of wealth and power. Questions such as how to organize relations of
production between business and workers, how to allocate power between capital and
labour, and what the state’s role should be in mediating among them and through which
institutions should the state intervene. De la Cueva, for instance, drafted the project for
the sentence of the Supreme Court’s Labour Law Chamber that was the basis for the oil
companies’ expropriation decree by President Lázaro Cárdenas. He was also Chair of the
Commission that wrote the second federal labour statute, enacted in 1970, which was an
effort to reinvigorate worker protections and renovate some of the redistributive and
transformative aspirations that De la Cueva believed had stagnated.
Notably, the political project can be seen as facilitated by the professional one, with
its claim to authoritative knowledge and expertise. The professional project is also a
struggle for the prevalence and influence of ideas that are deemed to have better
economic and social consequences in society. For De la Cueva, labour law was not only a
new discipline but also, and perhaps primarily, a new tool for the social and economic
transformation of the country.
(3) The transnational project. This is a project that seeks to establish a new
relationship of equals between the geopolitical periphery, where Mexico is situated, and
the centre. In this case, De la Cueva and other labour scholars attempted to establish this
relationship by arguing that Mexico had transcended, or anticipated, Europe.113 They
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claimed the genesis of social rights and pointed to the 1917 Constitution as the first
“social” constitution in the world. De la Cueva asserts, “We can affirm that life
anticipated doctrine, because in 1917 … the first Declaration of Social Rights in history
was proclaimed in Querétaro [México], and two years later in Weimar.”114
This claim lent enormous credibility to the national project of reconstruction.
Furthermore, claiming that the project was progressive enabled these legal scholars to
advocate for progressive politics in the Mexico by reference to the Constitution. It was a
claim of progressive originalism. When new questions of interpretation arose, they could
argue that the Constitution required the progressive one.
This would not be the first time that legal scholars participated in creating a narrative
of national pride. For example, in many of the newly independent states in Latin America
in the nineteenth century, legal elites claimed a specific uniqueness or identity for their
country that preceded the Spanish colonialists and differentiated the new nation from
Spain. This uniqueness allowed them to claim a place in the concert of nations as an
independent and sovereign entity and provided cohesion for the domestic project.115
Legal scholars in several Latin American countries were actively involved in defending
the sovereignty of their countries. They were busy creating new legal doctrines that
would allow their countries to be shielded from threats of foreign intervention. These
doctrinal innovations were touted as coming out of the new countries, belonging to the
tradition of, while simultaneously renewing, international law.116 Thus, these scholars
would claim that Latin American international law had contributed something original to
the discipline, demanding recognition as peers in the international arena. This claim
allowed them to legitimate the projects of their national governments at home.
Although these three projects are analytically distinct, they are no doubt intermingled.
For instance, in De la Cueva’s case, these projects reinforce each other in important
ways. The transnational project advocating a historic national contribution seems
instrumental to enable his professional and political projects domestically. International
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recognition gives credence to De la Cueva’s professional aspirations and opens the space
for political intervention at home.
So why is it important to problematize the traditional narrative and to show its biases,
make-beliefs and contradictions? In my view, there are at least two compelling reasons.
First, it has the potential to render the three projects – professional, political and
transnational – visible and, thus, open them up for contestation. Challenging the
traditional labour law narrative may open the field to new ways of thinking about labour
relations. The challenge may also foster legal institutional imagination and policy
innovation.
Second, questioning the traditional narrative may enable a clearer analysis of the
consequences of the status quo. At one level, the analysis may illuminate who wins and
who loses under the current narrative – whose professional and political projects are
advanced and whose are hindered. At another level, the challenge may facilitate a more
concrete analysis of the consequences of the labour law regime in place by examining
how specific rules and institutions affect the distribution of wealth and power in society.
In the past, social law advocates failed to engage with a number of important critiques
to social legislation, coming from all sides of the political spectrum. Feminists challenged
labour regulation for its gender bias, creating a division of labour that relegated women to
the household and left them out of the market. When women did enter the market, they
were discriminated against with fewer opportunities and lower wages.117 A liberal
critique challenged the corporatist character of social law, noting that the labour law
regime relied on an alliance between the government, employers and official unions that
impinged on worker liberty, and led union leaders to disregard the interests of the rank
and file, focusing instead in obtaining personal and political benefits in exchange for
agreements.118 Social theorists and social movements challenged the social law regime of
the welfare state as a statist, bureaucratic system of social control in the service of liberal
capitalism. The labour law regime, worked to create an obedient working class that was
trained to respect authority and accept its limited and subordinated role in decisions of
economic production and distribution.119 Finally, neoclassical economists challenged
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labour regulation as a barrier to job creation, firms’ competitiveness and economic
growth.120
Some of these critiques are more warranted than others, and their veracity depends on
each particular context.121 They are critiques of social law and of labour regulation by
advocates on the left and on the right of the political spectrum. What they have in
common is that they are consequentialist. They focus on labour regulation’s effects on
different groups of workers: female workers, youth, non-unionized or informal workers;
on workers’ subjectivity and their role in society; on workers’ ability to be represented;
on employers; and on the economy as a whole.
Defending social law – or labour rights – as a national asset and as the achievement of
a revolutionary struggle or as a fundamental pillar in the Constitution are ways to justify
a social law regime without addressing its effects. In this way, advocates for labour miss
an opportunity to evaluate the consequences of the labour regulation they defend and to
engage with critics on their own terms. Once the national identity argument is put aside,
new opportunities to both defend some aspects of the current regime and to re-imagine it
become apparent.
The critiques of the use of national identity and of the assumption that social law in
Mexico is progressive may serve as a warning against the romanticisation of social law as
a transformative project. Mexico shows that identity-based and deontological arguments
can be successful in creating national pride and mobilizing support for specific
institutions; but they cannot justify a legal regime based on its effects. Moreover, these
arguments might end up legitimating a regime that does not advance workers’ welfare.
Currently in Mexico, many progressives resist the neoliberal flexibility program by
invoking the achievements of the revolution and the 1917 Mexican Constitution. They
assert that the current legal and constitutional framework has a progressive character that
can help resist calls to dismantle current labour market regulation. As I have examined,
however, treating social law as having an inherently progressive character is not
historically warranted in the case of Mexico. When progressives retrench behind national
pride or constitutional rights’ arguments to resist the neoliberal flexibility reform they
implicitly concede too much. When their main line of defence is that workers’ rights
cannot be touched, they concede that the economic effects of current labour law regime
might as well be negative but that they do not have an answer to that challenge.
Moreover, this line of defence also makes it harder to think of imaginative, progressive
alternatives to current market regulation.
On the other hand, those advocating for neoliberal flexibility reform increasingly use
the malleable social law discourse to make their case. In Mexico, this is most evident in
the PRI bill, which argues that flexibility reforms are necessary to help workers.122 The
bill claims that the historical achievements of the Revolution and workers’ rights
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consecrated in the Constitution will remain untouched.123 It is perhaps fitting for the PRI
to advance such reform. After all, it is the party that institutionalized the national
revolution and used that discourse to legitimate its rule. Now, having been out of power
for twelve years, the PRI is trying to craft a compromise between employers’ associations
and unions. Despite its rhetoric, however, this compromise is likely not to benefit most
workers.
A striking feature of the PRI bill is that it frames a neoliberal flexibility program for
market regulation as a social law program. Thus, the PRI bill maintains that greater
flexibility in hiring and firing is necessary to help create jobs, particularly for women and
youth, and to promote competitiveness, productivity and growth.124 PRI promotes these
reforms while claiming that it is motivated by the historical achievements of enshrining
workers rights in the Constitution, which will continue to guide labour market regulation.
At best, this bill is a promise to legalize the status quo.
E. Implications of the Mexican Story for Debates in Other Countries
The Mexican story offers several valuable lessons for labour law debates in other
countries. First, Mexico shows that, despite is traditional association with progressive
politics, the social is politically indeterminate. As an international phenomenon, social
law took different political valences in different countries, from left to right in the
political spectrum and from democratic to authoritarian forms of government.
Second, Mexico shows that arguments based on national identity and
constitutional rights face serious problems. These arguments often fail to diagnose the
effects of current labour market regulation, offer no response to consequentialist critiques
of current regulation and offer no proposals for reimagining labor regulation to increase
workers’ wellbeing. Consequently, if neoliberals promote a flexibility reform couched on
social law ideals, pro-labour advocates have a hard time offering an alternative program.
Third, the social was in fact a truly global phenomenon, despite claims that it was
unique to and created by each country where it was introduced. This is important to keep
in mind, because the arguments of national identity and constitutional rights considerably
constrain the analysis to a specific country. Taking seriously the social’s transnational
character would help to analyze that country’s situation in the global economy, thinking
of how it is affected by its place in the world market and its relationship with other
countries.
In the next section, I explore the relevance of the insights from Mexico for
contemporary debates about labour regulation elsewhere, specifically in Europe. The
effects of market economic integration in the EU and the perceived hampering of social
provisions in the Member States have sparked a debate about the need to ensure the
preservation of basic social protections as part of the Union. This debate has been framed
in terms of identity and the allegedly inherent progressiveness of social law. I will
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examine parallels between Europe case and Mexico and use the insights gained from the
case of Mexico to raise some caveats.
II. National Identity in Current Debates about Social Regulation in Europe
In Europe, the social position has also been articulated on identity terms at the regional
level. Advocates and scholars associate the creation of “Social Europe” with values that
are considered indigenous to the Union and, therefore, must be defended on those terms.
This is not limited to social regulation; these arguments are also advanced in private law,
as it is visible in the debate about harmonization and the call for a “common core” that
reflects European social values.125
Simultaneously, at the national level, advocates of social regulation resort to a similar
identity argument to defend their welfare state’ worker protections and social insurance
programs against what is perceived as menacing European economic integration model.
In this view, the EU’s market-oriented policies threaten the existence of the welfare state
and, with it, something fundamental about the nation’s identity. This national level
pushback against the EU model may be particularly acute now in the aftermath of the
financial crisis.
This is not to say that all social position arguments are premised upon national or
regional identity; however, these arguments remain powerful and thus, deserve critical
scrutiny. For progressives, the obvious upside of defending social law on the basis of
identity is that it provides an easy and energizing point of resistance. The problem is that
identity conjures up essences and obfuscates trade-offs and distributional consequences.
It also portrays the status quo as desirable and makes it harder to articulate alternatives to
the existing law that could potentially better meet progressives’ underlying interests and
goals. Lastly, the emphasis on national identity eschews analysis of social regulation’s
implication in transnational problems with transnational constituencies.126
A. The Use of Identity and the Push to Constitutionalize Social Rights
Since the start of the European integration project after World War II, whether and how
to regulate social policy at the supranational level has remained a central question.
Progressives in Europe have widely used identity arguments to promote a social rights
agenda, which is evident in the debates over “Social Europe.” Take, for instance, the
debate over the contents of a potential European Constitution, which was in the works in
the early 2000s.127 Similar to Mexico, identity was a key force mobilizing the
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establishment of social rights. European progressives argued that European identity was
closely connected to the “social” because of the history of welfare protection in Member
States, and, thus, constitutionalizing this social identity was the way forward for the EU.
Jurgen Habermas famously asked for the constitutionalization of Europe’s social self.
He argued that it was these values, in part, that set Europe apart from the rest of the world
and which could provide the necessary glue for the further integration that was sorely
needed in the face of unfettered globalization:
In Western Europe … the political tradition of the workers’ movement, the
salience of Christian social doctrines and even a certain normative core of
social liberalism still provide a formative background for social solidarity.
In their public self-representations, Social and Christian Democratic
parties in particular support inclusive systems of social security and a
substantive conception of citizenship, which stresses what John Rawls
calls ‘the fair value’ of equally distributed rights. In terms of a
comparative cultural analysis, we might speak of the unique European
combination of public collectivisms and private individualism.128
Miguel Maduro, who later served as Advocate General in the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), called on the EU to initiate an open discussion on its “social identity” and
its “social self” in the constitutional debates. Maduro noted the “subsidiary and underdeveloped nature of Europe’s social citizenship when compared with its original market
citizenship” and argued that whatever social rights the EU had granted its citizens, it had
done so by virtue of the economic value of these citizens rather than respect for their
basic dignity.129 His account of why Europe needed to constitutionalize the “social”
explicitly relied on identity:
Simply stated, Europe must, as Kierkegaard would say, discuss its
identity. … As it now stands, and in Kierkegaard’s terms, it faces despair:
the despair of wanting to be oneself and the despair of not wanting to be
oneself. I do not know the resolution but I believe that future
developments of the Union depend on a discussion of this identity or,
perhaps better, on a discussion of its underlying social contract. … To
ignore this “social identity question” in the forthcoming constitutional
debates of the European Union may well correspond to the dangerous path
of which Kierkegaard warned: “The biggest danger, that of losing oneself,
can pass off in the world as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss,
an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc., is bound to be noticed.”130
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These positions share a reaction to the negative consequences of market integration in
Europe and an identity-based project of building “Social Europe” as way to include social
values in a future European Constitution.131 The aim was that, once constitutionalized,
social rights could provide the social insurance and solidarity mechanisms to reshape
economic integration. Social rights would thus achieve equal status with the economic
freedoms and the efficiency rationale thus far driving the integration process.132
B. Identity as Resistance
Just as social progressives in Mexico use the supposedly close connection between
national identity and the “social” to resist neoliberal reforms, social progressives in
individual European states also resisted the process of further Europeanization through
appeal to national identity.
Take, for instance, the French “no” campaign against the Constitutional Treaty. The
campaign referenced the danger that the imagined low-wage immigrant, such as the
“Polish plumber,” constituted for the French social model and the danger that expansion
to the East would constitute for French identity.133 A group of entrepreneurs intervening
in favour of the “yes” vote felt compelled to answer the appeal to national identity. They
argued that a France weakened by a “no” vote would have less influence in the
deliberation over the European social model and would not be as able to push for the
fundamental values of French society at the European level.134 Economist Frédéric
Lordon reproached the “yes” camp for failing to note that “the social State and public
services [are] … fundamental elements of political and symbolic French grammar” and,
thus, “[France] can’t renounce them under any circumstances.”135
National identity defences of the social welfare model has been even stronger in
certain Scandinavian countries, where national identity has been constructed in close
connection with the welfare state.136 Writing on the Nordic model, Mary Hilson notes
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that “the welfare state is still regarded as an integral part of the meaning of
Scandinavia.”137 The difference Scandinavian countries perceive between themselves as
an “egalitarian social democratic community of destiny” and the “capitalist and Catholic
European continent” fuels opposition to European integration.138 This identity-based
defence of the welfare model has also resulted in a xenophobic discourse that specifically
singles out foreigners as a potential burden to the generous welfare regimes of the
north.139
While the project of national resistance may share the objective of social protection
with those seeking to Europeanize social rights through treaty incorporation, it does not
share their optimism that regionalization of social policy would be effective or ultimately
beneficial. It is not surprising that some of the most vociferous opposition has taken place
in countries with robust welfare systems, which fear that these hard-fought protections
would be eroded. Remarkably, both groups use identity as a strategy to mobilize their
agenda. At the regional level, social advocates mobilize European identity to propose a
positive program of reform in the EU treaty and institutions; other social advocates
mobilize national identity to resist the further encroachment of EU law on their national
social protections.
C. Identity to What Effect?
Social progressives’ call for the Europeanization of social rights was partly answered by
the Constitutional Treaty, which ultimately failed, and the Lisbon Treaty, which largely
replicated the Constitutional Treaty’s provisions, and was accepted and entered into
force. The Lisbon Treaty also incorporated by reference the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which includes a series of social rights, even though it explicitly excludes an
interpretation that would widen the scope of the EU’s competences.140 Moreover, on
social policy, the EU is said to be a “social market economy” 141 striving for “smart,
sustainable, and inclusive growth,”142 while the European welfare states are featured in
the Commission’s reports as a “productive factor” rather than as an impediment to
growth.143
What have been the effects of the inclusion of social policy in the EU? I suggest that
the relevance of social policy language in EU law has been tested in two crucial ways.
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The first test has taken the form of a string of highly controversial cases in the ECJ,
where national collective bargaining regulations were in tension with EU economic
freedom rights. The second test has been provided by the ongoing Euro financial crisis
and the European response to tackle it. At a moment of crisis, how the rescue program
takes shape would reveal how substantive the commitments to social protection are and
whether the social agenda’s aspiration to reshape Europe’s economic integration has any
chance to succeed. So far, the evidence, although not the rhetoric, seems to suggest
otherwise.144
First, a new phase in the resistance to Europeanization began after a series of
decisions by the ECJ between 2007 and 2008 created intense anxiety about the future of
the Nordic model, especially regarding collective bargaining.145 The Viking case, in
which a Finnish ship sought to reflag under an Estonian flag in order to lower its labour
costs, provoked strong reactions.146 The ECJ ruled that industrial action aimed at stopping
an undertaking from exercising its freedom of establishment was a prima facie violation
of the Treaties. Worker protection was a legitimate goal in the industrial action of the
union, but it would have to be established by the national courts that specific jobs were in
danger, and that there were not in fact less restrictive means for achieving this goal. All
of these requirements were novel for the national labour law regimes.
In the Laval case, a Latvian construction company undertook work in Sweden for
which it posted Latvian workers to Sweden.147 The local Swedish union began
negotiations with Laval in order to set the wage rates for the Latvian workers. The
Swedish industrial relations system leaves setting of wage rates to sector specific
negotiations between management and labour. Laval, which had already signed a
collective agreement including the setting of wages with a Latvian union, refused to sign
onto the local collective agreement for the Swedish building sector. The agreement would
have forced it to pay the Latvian workers rates much higher than it had planned. The
Swedish union then blockaded Laval construction sites, and a secondary, sympathy
boycott was undertaken by the local electricians’ union. This industrial action, which was
legal in Sweden up until that point, was effective, and Laval had to back out of its
contracts and declare bankruptcy in Sweden.
The ECJ court decided that labour law as such was not outside the scope of Treaty
provisions on free movement. Significantly, it recognized collective action as a
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fundamental right to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental economic
freedoms recognized by the Treaties. The court found that collective action limiting free
movement of services, such as the one at stake, needed to be exercised for reasons of
public interest and needed to be proportional to its legitimate end. Conceding that the
protection of workers was a legitimate end, the Court nonetheless found that the specific
industrial action had been disproportionate.
These decisions prompted intense reactions from social progressives, particularly in
Scandinavia.148 Even the European Economic and Social Committee urged the EU to
strengthen its social protections at the constitutional level, advocating for a Treaty change
to help balance social and economic rights.149
Ulrich Muckenberger, who was involved with the 1997 “Manifesto for Social
Europe” advocating for the constitutionalization of social values, urged a “Post Laval
Social Manifesto,” claiming that the ECJ’s balancing of social rights against civil
liberties was legally incorrect.150 According to this account, the inclusion of social rights
in EU law has not made much of a difference because they remain subordinated to
market access rights. This typically progressive stance, however, bears some analysis as
well. More specifically, it would be important to analyze the consequences of these ECJ
judgments beyond the formal, legal prevalence of one right over another.151 The language
of social rights and “Social Europe” is equated with the wellbeing of all workers. But the
cases show that the interests of Western and Eastern European workers may not be
necessarily aligned – in fact, they can be at odds with one another. This does not mean
that they cannot be made compatible, for example by establishing a minimum floor of
labour standards throughout Europe and avoiding capital flight to other continents. It
would be necessary, though, to show how that would be pursued. Otherwise, it would
seem that European workers would be better-off had the ECJ decided these cases the
opposite way; this glosses over conditions for workers in Eastern Europe and the social
development prospects for the new EU members.
Second, the EU has seemingly incorporated social policy in its formal response to the
financial crisis.152 In response to the crisis, the EU implemented financial reform,
financial stabilization, economic governance reforms, and measures to facilitate
growth.153 Although securing a stable economy through economic governance reforms
may help growth, this is unlikely to happen under stringent austerity measures. Because
Member States do not have autonomy over their monetary policy and cannot devalue
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their currency, they are experiencing considerable pressure to turn to labour law
deregulation and to scale back workers’ protections as a strategy to address their fiscal
woes. 154 At the same time, the EU’s 2020 strategy for growth would require significant
government spending, which, given Member State’s indebtedness, seems unforeseeable.
Of the EU responses, the Euro Plus Pact (EPP)155 and the Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU) between the EU/IMF and countries under bailout assistance,156
have had the greatest impact on national labour laws. Both the EPP and the MoU
suggested that Member States reform their labour laws to ensure competitiveness and
facilitate growth. The MoU, significantly more intrusive than the EPP, conditions the
receipt of financial assistance on implementing labour law reforms.157 These reforms also
have a disciplining effect on other countries in crisis, because they send a message that
they, too, should deregulate their labour laws.158 After an analysis of the EU’s response to
the financial crisis, Barnard concludes that:
Traditionally, the EU has been seen as something of a bastion against
deregulation at national level, and at least this body of directives continues
to provide a floor of rights. Yet, now the EU – whether through the
Council formations in the context of its recommendations in the integrated
guidelines or at least the heads of state or government – has become
responsible for the very deregulation it resisted for many years. Longer
term, the EU may be responsible for precipitating a race to the bottom.159
In the last two years, the Commission has promoted the goal of defending the
“European social model” in its communications regarding the Euro crisis.160 The
Economic and Social Committee also considers the European social model so unique that
it should be promoted in Europe’s development assistance programs to poor countries.161
However, the Lisbon Treaty’s inclusion of social rights and the enthusiasm about
Social Europe indeed may not have made much difference in the EU’s response to the
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euro crisis. On this front, the character of Social Europe must be measured against the
effects of the austerity measures in each nation and how their costs and benefits are
distributed between societal groups and among the Member States.
As we have seen, the EU uses identity-based social justifications to pursue policies
that might not qualify as progressive. Indeed, a number of progressive scholars have
expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction of Social Europe in the last decade,
especially considering the ECJ’s labour rights rulings.162 Even progressive supporters of
the EU level were disillusioned after Laval.163 It is arguable that the EU’s seemingly
neoliberal policies are now being pursued under the guise of “social” discourse.
What have been the limits of using identity arguments to promote a social rights
strategy to advance an economic agenda? Progressives in Europe quite successfully
enshrined social rights in European treaty law, and promoted a Social Europe identity. So
far, however, the results seem paltry at best. For example, during the recent Euro crisis,
having adopted a Social Europe model does not seem to have made much difference.
This opens social rights to the familiar critique of legitimation, claiming that they are
enabling economic policies by reference to their compatibility to the social model, which
would otherwise look less palatable. The European experience also shows that resorting
to identity and social rights may obscure the distributional effects of policies on different
kinds of workers; the insistence on preserving a set of social rights might limit the
imagination of alternatives that may perhaps offer greater traction.
III. Labour Reform and Economic Development: Thinking About Potential
Alternatives
New possibilities might open up if one thinks about labour regulation beyond its familiar
associations, particularly in the case of Mexico. I have argued that the defence of current
labour regulation in the name of revolutionary achievement, cultural pride or
constitutional rights should no longer be sufficient without evidence of its social and
economic benefits. When progressives cling to these arguments, they, perhaps
inadvertently, concede too much. They concede that labour regulation is necessarily bad
for firms, markets and the country’s growth prospects; they pass on an opportunity to
challenge the powerful discourse of labour flexibility; and they forego a necessary
diagnosis of the current problem. Thus, they surrender an invaluable opportunity to
imagine alternatives. Their main strategy is resistance, and their only alternative is the
defence of the mostly indefensible status quo.
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Proponents of labour flexibility argue that rigid restrictions and compulsory clauses in
the employment contract make it harder for firms to hire and fire, which in turn translates
to less job creation, lower productivity and depressed economic growth. Progressives
should re-appropriate the language and aspirations of labour flexibility. This should not
only mean flexibility for employers to hire and fire at will, but also for workers.
Progressives could promote an agenda that makes flexibility a means to turn the
workplace into a meaningful life experience for millions of workers. Repetitive and
deadening activities in factories and shops, with rigid hierarchies and little or no
contribution of workers in firms’ productive decisions, is routine in many sectors of the
Mexican economy.
Too many firms rely on rigid and outdated systems of production and management.
Flexibility could be a rallying cry to reform those modes of production. It could foster
innovation by prioritizing learning and experimentation so that firms resemble schools
and workers are encouraged to contribute ideas. Flexibility could change the hierarchical
structure of firms from a rigid, vertical structure, to a horizontal one where employees
work in teams and are required to participate in projects over which they have ownership
and are encouraged to develop critical thinking and collaboration.164 Flexibility could
mean a workplace where competition and cooperation channel work towards a common
purpose and give workers an opportunity to realize themselves. That these goals seem
unpractical or even utopian in Mexico says more about the rigidity of our firms’
management and systems of production than of the desirability or feasibility of these
aspirations.
Flexibility should also mean labour mobility. For too long, employers forewent their
ability to fire, hire, and bargain over working conditions in return for industrial peace.
They obtained stability and the return on their human capital investment by ensuring
workers they had trained remained in the firm for their entire productive life. Workers
sacrificed their aspiration to participation in management and production decisions – or
even of ownership – and their ability to withhold their labour and disrupt production.
Workers were promised secure, stable jobs that paid family wages and provided benefits.
This bargain worked relatively well for many years when internal labour markets where
dominant and the domestic economy was substantially shielded from global competition.
No longer. If global economic and regulatory changes have fundamentally altered this
bargain, progressives have an opportunity to contest these conditions and reshape the
bargain. A cornerstone of the old bargain was permanent employment, sustained by a rule
of just-cause dismissal. Given the new conditions of global economic competition, it
makes increasingly less sense for progressives to look for security of workers at firm
level in all sectors. Progressives could promote security of workers through helping them
develop marketable skills – encouraging worker investment not in the firm, but in their
own personal capabilities.165
In the old bargain, compensation upon unjust dismissal provided a cushion for
workers to make ends meet while they re-entered the labour market. This compensation
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worked as the functional equivalent of unemployment insurance. Progressives could
promote the establishment of universal unemployment insurance, paid by society as a
whole through the tax system. The details of the insurance and policies to encourage
labour market re-entry would need to be worked out, but this would protect workers
against dismissal while giving firms the flexibility they demand. Workers would be less
dependent on one particular firm and instead encouraged to invest in their skills for the
market in general.
Benefits, such as health care and pension funds, were a crucial aspect of the
permanent employment relationship. This highlights the fact that labour regulation cannot
be analyzed in a vacuum, but rather must be seen as part of a broader social bargain
between capital, labour and the state, institutionalized as social security benefits. It is not
surprising that workers would hang on to job security today because without a formal job
they would lose accrued benefits and be deprived of social insurance. Furthermore, jobs
with benefits, even in the formal economy, are increasingly hard to find. Once social
insurance benefits like health insurance, pensions, childcare, workers’ compensation, and
affordable housing are universally available to all citizens, job security becomes
considerably less important.
Portable skills without jobs are useless. These reforms would need to be paired with a
concerted strategy to stimulate the economy and create jobs. Labour flexibility, as it is
currently advanced, is no development strategy. Even though it is currently promoted as
one of the pending structural reforms and a key that would open the door to firm’s
competitiveness and job creation, it is hard to see how that would happen. At best, it is a
strategy to increase firms’ productivity at the margins through reduction in labour costs
and further precarisation of jobs. This is not a sustainable, long-term strategy for job
creation, much less a strategy for economic growth.
To see why the proposal of the dominant flexibility agenda is an illusion one needs to
look no further than at how the labour market operates in practice – not simply what the
law in the books says, but the rules governing everyday action. There is already rampant
flexibility in the labour market. Many economic sectors are already quite flexible, where
the employment contract restrictions in hiring and firing are honoured in the breach and
benefits are not part of the contract. This de facto labour flexibility is sometimes achieved
by breach. Sometimes it is by ingeniously bypassing the law, for example, by hiring
workers through a third party. Furthermore, by some estimates, half of the labour force
works in the informal economy, which is as flexible as it gets. Flexibility in labour costs
can also be measured by looking at the dramatic decline in real wages in Mexico. Mexico
has some of the lowest real wages in Latin America.166 Since the 1990s, the productivity
gains resulting from declining labour costs have mostly gone to employers.
To better diagnose the labour market, we must recognize that there are several labour
law regimes that operate in the economy. Even though the applicable labour law is the
same, its real hold varies. The likelihood of effective enforcement increases with the size
and market relevance of firms, effective worker representation, probability of inspection
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visits and expedited remedies by labour tribunals. Consider three different labour law
regimes that I call “employee-friendly,” “employer-friendly” and “free-for-all.” 167
In the employee-friendly regime, the current labour law is applied at its fullest.
Employees work under permanent contracts and enjoy most benefits provided by law.
This regime operates in a few economic sectors like manufacturing, mining and
electricity, particularly medium-size and big firms. These are the traditionally unionized
sectors, where workers often have effective representation and employers have an interest
in preserving their investment in workers’ human capital by avoiding turnover. These are
also the firms that are most visible and likely to be caught by inspectors or sued by
workers if they break the law.
In the employer-friendly regime, labour restrictions are loose and benefits scarce or
non-existent. Limitations on hiring and firing are bypassed by outsourcing and by
employing workers as independent contractors. Labour law is vastly underenforced or
subverted by legal fictions and, given low levels of worker organisation, firms enjoy de
facto labour flexibility. This regime is operative in many sectors including services,
tourism and food preparation, and it is most prevalent in micro, small and medium size
firms.
The free-for-all regime is the informal economy, where labour law does not reach and
where firms mostly operate entirely outside the regulatory framework. This is a highly
flexible regime where workers and employers can bargain depending on their actual
power, and can expect very little legal enforcement.
Would making the labour regulation more flexible achieve what its proponents
promise? Hardly, it seems. The only sector where it could have real bite is the employeefriendly regime, because it is not flexible already. However, the potential benefits need to
be analyzed. The claim that labour flexibility would create jobs and increase output
assumes that the demand for labour is quite elastic. These relevant economic sectors are
quite capital intensive, however, with labour costs representing a small share of the total
cost of production. When the share of labour costs—such as wages and labour
protections—in the firm’s total costs is small, the labour demand tends to be inelastic.
Under this scenario a decrease in labour costs, due to more flexible regulation, is unlikely
to have a significant impact on job creation.168
Even if cheaper labour costs create jobs in these industries, these may result in the
significant deterioration of wages and working conditions. Given fixed capital costs and a
small share of labour in total costs, lower wages and labour benefits may not guarantee
higher overall productivity. Even if we were to see an increase in productivity, past
productivity increases due to lowered wages does not confirm a link between higher
productivity and job creation.169 We can only see this by analysing the employee-friendly
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regime with the specific sector it regulates and looking at how the law operates in reality,
not by treating it in the abstract.
In the current debate, there is surprisingly little diagnosis of how labor regulation
actually works and what a flexibility reform would mean for different economic sectors
as well as for workers and employers in these different labor regimes. Labour regulation
does not have to be the same for all sectors. Different economic sectors can have different
forms of labour contracts. Labour regulation is not uniform on the books or in practice.
Any labour reform should be part of a broader development strategy, taking into account
the conditions of different economic sectors and the role they would play in the overall
national strategy for competition and job creation.
One final, crucial element of a labour flexibility reform concerns unions and
unionized workers. Unions must be able to compete with one another, and workers
should be empowered to participate in the governance of their unions and to challenge
their leadership. For too long, the democratic aspirations of society have been suspended
in the workplace. There is no reason why democratic life and the desire to experience
meaningful participation and influence in society should stop at the firm’s door, where
workers spend a significant part of their lives. Such a reform would require the
disentanglement of the government from control over union’s existence, elections and
governance – much like it has happened with political parties. Similarly, an independent
body could be entrusted to register unions, monitor their internal elections and ensure
electoral competition between them to gain majority control over collective agreements.
If union life is to be democratic – and the unions are to be attractive again to society –
there should be competition over union leadership. This requires elimination of reelection or else term-limits. Furthermore, serious remedies must be available to workers
to challenge their leaders when their interests have been affected. This does not mean
dismantling all the elements of the collective bargaining system. Some, which enable
workers to organize and help avert collective action problems, may be retained. But these
rules, like the closed-shop and compulsory union fees, have been subverted for too long
against the interest of workers. These mechanisms of collective bargaining would be
worth preserving only if corporatist institutions can be reformed to foster independent
unions and a vigorous workforce that makes leadership accountable.
Conclusion
In the current global economic conditions, labour law advocates find themselves on the
defence. There are strong pressures worldwide to dismantle labour regulations and social
security institutions. These regulations were introduced in the twentieth century as
modern states stepped in to ensure a minimum floor of protections for workers and to
century. However, this productivity increase has not had an impact on employment levels. In the year 2000,
employment levels had not recovered from 1993 levels, despite significant growth in the maquiladora
industry in the same period. Lower levels of employment can be attributed to an increase in labour
productivity, which grew 46.3 per cent from 1993 to 2000, massive layoffs in the non-maquiladora
manufacturing sectors due to an increase in competition from imports, and dismemberment of chains of
production in the domestic market. See De la Garza Toledo, Enrique Estructura Industrial y Condiciones
de Trabajo en la Manufactura, in La Situación Del Trabajo En Mexico (2003) 251, 254-55.
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mediate conflict between labour and capital. Once seen as a sign of a modern and
dynamic industrial economy, labour regulation is derided today as a rigid vestige of the
past. The rallying cry for reform is “labour flexibility,” which is associated with all things
positive of the new economy and proposes to cure the ills of unemployment, lack of
competitiveness, and stagnant growth.
Faced with the attack on labour regulation, advocates of social law resort to three
powerful defences: identity and national pride, the historically progressive character of
labour law and labour rights as constitutional or human rights. These powerful
arguments may be potential antidotes to deregulatory pressures. Proffered strategically to
resist labour flexibility reform, when deemed less desirable than the status quo, these
arguments may have some instrumental value. I argue in this article, however, that they
also have significant downsides. These arguments eschew an analysis of the
consequences of existing labour regulation, and they fail to answer the flexibility
critiques, even if they are unfounded. Additionally, these arguments make it harder to
imagine alternative, progressive regulatory mechanisms to address workers’ concerns
other than hanging on to the status quo.
Analysing Mexican labour law’s traditional narrative, I have challenged claims of
workers’ rights national originality and inherent progressiveness. I show that the
emergence of workers’ rights and labour legislation in Mexico was the result of a truly
international phenomenon, where foreign ideas and laws played an important role.
Moreover, the constitutionalization of workers’ rights and subsequent labour legislation
was more the result of a political compromise than the historical victory of a radical
program. These challenges call for rethinking labour regulation, even to defend parts of
it, by looking at its current effects rather than by invoking national myths that elude these
questions, however dear these stories might be.
In the present debate, the PRI has used the social law discourse, resorting to national
pride and to labour regulation’s assumed progressiveness, to advance a bill that includes
the flexibility recipes for employment contracts and preserves the worst aspects of
corporatism in collective bargaining favouring old, official unions. This shows how
malleable the social position can be and questions its association with a necessarily
progressive political position.
The insights from Mexico may be relevant for other countries where social advocates
use similar identity-based arguments and equate labour regulation with necessarily
progressive results. In Europe, advocates have used identity-based arguments to defend
social regulation, including labour law, at the regional and the national levels. Regionally,
advocates have attempted to constitutionalize social rights, arguing that they should be
recognized as inherent part of European identity expressed in the notion of “Social
Europe.” Their aim is to reshape European economic integration by introducing regional
social values. Nationally, social advocates less keen on the regional project have used
identity to defend domestic labour regulation and national welfare institutions against the
inroads of unfettered market integration.
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To some extent, these projects might be useful in resisting labour market
deregulation. But by portraying existing labour regulation as the best alternative, they
obscure its negative consequences and make it harder to think of different legal
arrangements. At the EU level, the project of consitutionalising social rights has been
successful, resulting in new treaty language and increasingly socially-oriented EU
commission discourse. However, several ECJ cases and the EU’s response to the
financial crisis make clear that social law is very capacious and can be co-opted by both
the neoliberal market-integration project and the labour flexibility program. The
constitutionalization of social rights, social advocates have painfully found out, does not
necessarily lead to the results they foresaw. This highlights the political indeterminacy of
social law discourse and the downsides of a strategy predicated on identity and
constitutional rights.
Domestically, the retrenchment to the national welfare state as a strategy to resist the
EU integration project may also lose sight of problems within the existing social model.
Additionally, it narrows the view to the national arena precisely at the time when vital
questions of competition and distribution, between capital and labour and between
different groups of workers, involve transnational rules and actors. The critique of the
supposed national or regional identity arguments in social law seeks to broaden the scope
to the transnational arena, thinking about collective solutions for workers in the face of
regulatory competition. By doing this comparison, I do not mean to suggest that the
situation in Mexico and Europe is the same or that the critiques in the Mexican context
are simply transferable. Instead, I seek to illuminate important parallels in the arguments
advanced by social advocates. The insights from the Mexican analysis may be suggestive
of a broader phenomenon, perhaps one of progressive originalism running up against
arguments of economic necessity.
Using the Mexican case, I suggest that there is an opportunity to engage with the
deregulatory agenda for labour flexibility in a more productive way. First, we need a
more comprehensive diagnosis of how labour regulation takes hold in different economic
sectors. I argue that there are at least three different regimes in operation, ranging from
formality and effective enforcement, to loose enforcement to informality. By considering
the relationship between these labour regimes and economic sectors, we can better
imagine what the results of potential labour reform would be.
In my view pro-labour advocates could challenge the assumptions of labour
flexibility without needing to hang on to existing labour market regulation. They could
appropriate the aspirations of flexibility to benefit workers, demanding more ambitious
reforms that address firms’ outdated modes of production and management to create a
more participatory and meaningful workplace. At the same time, pro-labour advocates
can propose ending the dependency on permanent employment for basic entitlements
such as health, childcare and retirement funds, moving toward a universal coverage
system. This debate could be an opportunity to rethink legal mechanisms that empower
workers under conditions of global economic competition, and to do it while being
mindful of the effects on the country’s development prospects.
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